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The Rice v. Cayetano decision in which the Supreme Court struck 
down the voting requirement for Trustees of the Office of Hawaiian 
Affairs (OHA) that restricted eligible voters to only those of Hawai-
ian ancestry is an example of how apparently "neutral" legal deci-
sion making disguises intensely political aims. The narrative of the 
decision reflects not only a deep misunderstanding of Hawaiian his-
tory, but also constructs a too-familiar narrative of how Westerners 
"civilized" an indigenous people. Moreover, the Court's narrow and 
formalist approach to racial issues dictated a rigid binary analyti-
cal structure which distorted not only the claims of the Hawaiian 
people, but their very identity. In essence, they were forced to choose 
between whether they were a racial grouping but not a political en-
tity, or that they were a political entity but not a racial grouping 
when, in fact, they may be considered both. 
The analytic premise of the Article is that strict scrutiny analysis 
is inappropriate when dealing with many issues concerning Hawai-
ians--even if they are a racial grouping-since the harm of which 
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they complain is fundamentally different from the claims of other 
subordinated racial groupings within the United States. That is, 
while equal protection strict scrutiny seeks to protect groups ex-
cluded from the political and social processes within the United 
States, Hawaiians are asking for the redress of their loss of sover-
eignty caused by the United States and a remedying of the resulting 
harm which will, in essence, restore in some way their "separate-
ness" from the United States. 
Thus, the fundamental inquiry, consistent with the approach 
taken by other court decisions dealing with the claims of native peo-
ples, must be not whether Hawaiians constitute a "race" and thus 
are being given a "racial preference" by a particular voting limita-
tion, but whether they as a group have been specifically harmed by 
the illegal taking of their independence (a fact which the United 
States Congress itself acknowledged in 1993), and whether the vot-
ing limitation is rationally related to the remedying of that harm. 
The Court's refusal and failure to understand and deal with the nu-
ances of harm and remedy can only have a negative future impact 
not only on the future claims of indigenous people, but on the 
American people as a whole and particularly people of color. 
PROLOGUE 
Life in all its varied richness has a nasty habit of refusing to con-
form to the imperative categories of the Law. The recent Supreme 
Court decision in Rice v. Cayetano l starkly illustrates the limitations 
of traditional legal doctrine to address the interrelationship between 
race and the rights of indigenous peoples. This doctrinal failure, 
combined with the current Court's inability and unwillingness to un-
derstand the complexities of American racial interaction, has pro-
duced a result that neither addresses the specific needs and circum-
stances of the Hawaiian people, nor offers any hope to people of color 
in general that the Court can be depended upon to alleviate racial in-
justice. The Supreme Court's decision in Rice was driven, in essence, 
by a framework that squeezed complex identities into a simple binary 
universe-whether Native Hawaiians were either a "political entity" 
or a "racial group." This attempt to squeeze complex identities into a 
simple binary universe is reminiscent of the colloquy between Alice 
and the Cheshire Cat: 
"Cheshire Puss," she began, rather timidly, as she did not at all 
know whether it would like the name: however, it only grinned a little 
wider. "Come, it's pleased so far," thought Alice, and she went on. 
''Would you tell me, please, which way I ought to go from here?" 
"That depends a good deal on where you want to get to" said the 
Cat. 
1. 528 U.S. 495 (2000). 
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"I don't much care where -" said Alice. 
"Then it doesn't matter which way you go," said the Cat. 
"- so long as I get somewhere," Alice added as an explanation. 
"Oh, you're sure to do that," said the Cat, "if you only walk long 
enough." 
Alice felt that this could not be denied, so she tried another ques-
tion. ''What sort of people live about here?" 
"In that direction," the Cat said, waving its right paw round, 
"lives a Hatter: and in that direction," waving the other paw, "lives a 
March Hare. Visit either you like: they're both mad." 
"But I don't want to go among mad people," Alice remarked. 
"Oh, you can't help that," said the Cat: "we're all mad here. I'm 
mad. You're mad." 
"How do you know I'm mad?" said Alice. 
''You must be," said the Cat, "or you wouldn't have come here.'!'}. 
Just as Alice was trapped in the logical fallacy of the "false di-
lemma"-two choices are given, in a situation in which more than 
two choices exist-so too were Hawaiians forced to conform and to 
redefine themselves consistent with a legal doctrine constructed en-
tirely by the racial assumptions and categories of a "colorblind" 
Court. In fact, however, the reality of Hawaiian lives, history, and 
remedy was very different.3 Fortunately, Alice was able to wake from 
2. LEWIS CARROLL, ALICE IN WONDERLAND. 
3. The "reconstruction" of the existence of indigenous people is nothing new. See, 
e.g., Jo Carrillo, Identity as Idiom: Mashpee Reconsidered, 28 IND. L. REV. 511 (1995); 
Gerald Torres & Kathryn Milun, Translating Yonnonido by Precedent and Evidence: 
The Mashpee Indian Case, 1990 DUKE L.J. 625. 
In Mashpee Tribe v. Town of Mashpee, 447 F. Supp. 940 (D. Mass. 1978), affd sub 
nom., Mashpee Tribe v. New Seabury Corp., 592 F.2d 575 (1st Cir. 1979), the Mash-
pees in Massachusetts sued to recover land taken from them in violation of the Indian 
Non-Intercourse Act of 1790, which prohibited the transfer of Indian land to non-
Indians without federal approval. The defendant, the Town of Mashpee, answered by 
asserting that since the plaintiffs were not a "tribe," they were outside the protection 
of the act and lacked standing. Id. Thus, the Mashpees were forced to define them-
selves in terms of what the federal law required rather than what they, in fact, were. 
In an incisive piece on the Mashpee litigation, Professor Carrillo noted that there 
were significant obstacles that the Mashpees faced to show that they were a "tribe" 
under federal law: (1) they had to show they were made up of a distinct race, problem-
atic because there had been intermarriage over the years; (2) they had to show that 
they had a distinct political leadership, problematic because the tribal and town gov-
ernment had been intertwined for over a century; (3) they had to show they were so-
cially and culturally distinct, problematic since the Mashpees had adopted substantial 
aspects of American material culture; and (4) they had to show that the Mashpees in-
habited a particular territory, problematic as the Mashpees had first acquired title to 
their land with the help of an English missionary. Carrillo, supra, at 522. 
After concluding that the law on tribal identity "created and enforced a system of 
biases" ("Indianess" versus "non-Indianess"; "local" versus "Indian") as well as privileg-
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her dream of this parallel "mad" universe. Unfortunately, there is no 
waking from what the current Court has wrought. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
There are a number of classic cases in racial jurisprudence which 
tortured arbitrarily constructed, binary racial categories to conform 
to the desired racial imperatives of the times.4 For example, in People 
v. Hall,5 the California Supreme Court decided that Chinese were 
"Negroes" to exclude their testimony.6 In Ozawa v. United States,7 the 
ing certain aspects of proof over others (e.g., ethnographically derived "expert" testi-
mony over autoenthnographically derived testimony), Carrillo critiqued the scholarly 
literature that supported the Mashpee claims. In particular, she was wary of the ap-
proach suggested by Professors Torres and Milun in which they proposed a procedural 
solution. That is, given the structural biases against litigation in tribal culture, it was 
fairer to presume that Native American cultures were irreconcilably different from 
mainstream American culture than to have Indian plaintiffs litigate their identity. [d. 
at 531 (citing Torres & Milun, supra). Carrillo pointed out that the need theoretically 
to separate "Indianness" from "non-Indianness" carried within itself inherent dangers 
of essentialist stereotyping. [d. at 536-37. Carrillo concluded that because the law pre-
sumes Indian ways to be "primitive, chaotic, timeless, simple" and that "any tribal 
adaption to colonial society was in fact an assimilative embrace of the mai nstream," it 
was problematic to counter these stereotypes by implicitly endorsing others through 
general or theoretical statements about inherent Indian cultural differences. [d. at 
544-45. 
In the circumstances of the Mashpees, Carrillo found a rich body of local evidence 
showing how the Mashpee had historically, as a group, treated the waterfront area of 
the town as a common resource despite their adoption over the years of the notion of 
private property. [d. at 543-44. Thus, there was significant evidence through this and 
other examples that the Mashpee's-despite having lost control of the town lands, 
adopting certain non-Mashpee beliefs and practices, and intermarrying with towns-
people-had retained significant cultural identity. As such, "where territorial sepa-
rateness has been compromised," the legal process must "help reveal what is under the 
surface of the stereotype" to allow the claims of indigenous people for the preserv ation 
of the inherent sovereignty to go forward and to succeed. [d. at 545. 
4. Binary questions requiring "yes/no" answers also imply that there is a single 
answer and that answers are not affected "by who answered it or whose perceptions 
counted." MARTHA MINOW, MAKING ALL THE DIFFERENCE: INCLUSION, EXCLUSION, 
AND AMERICAN LAw 354 (1990). Minow preferred to approach the Mashpee issue with-
out deciding definitional questions in "either/or categories," and instead proposed a 
line of inquiry "whether the plaintiff, given its history, ought to receive protection from 
land sales under federal law." [d. at 351-56. According to Minow, a better way to re-
solve complex issues oftribal identity would be to look to the substance of the underly-
ing problem and to restructure the question in more fluid terms such as "for the pur-
pose of protection against unscrupulous property transactions, should [the Mashpee] 
be a tribe?" MARTHA MINOW, NOT ONLY FOR MYSELF 74 (1997). This approach would 
mitigate the law's tendency to make identities "seem fixed, innate, and clearly 
bounded" by acknowledging that they are "complex and negotiated interactions." [d. at 
59,74. 
5. 4 Cal. 399 (1854). 
6. [d. at 403. In Hall, a Caucasian was convicted of murder based upon the testi-
mony of Chinese witnesses. Two California statutes at that time forbade a "Negro" to 
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Supreme Court concluded that the "free white persons" eligible for 
naturalization were to be defined solely as Caucasians.8 Yet, that 
very same year, the Court in United States v. Thind9 held that a 
South Asian of Caucasian racial stock was not the kind of Caucasian 
included in the term "white person," and therefore was ineligible for 
naturalization.10 In the now infamous Plessy v. Ferguson 11 case, the 
give evidence in a civil trial in which a "White person" was a party, or a "Black, or Mu-
latto person, or Indian" was to give evidence in a criminal proceeding against, or for, "a 
white man." [d. at 399. The issue was whether the testimony of the Chinese witnesses 
was admissible. [d. That is, the court was to determine whether a Chinese person was 
Caucasian, Black, or Indian. The California Supreme Court held that the term "Negro" 
did not only include Black people, but instead meant simply, the "opposite of white" 
(white defined by the court "in its generic sense" as Caucasian, and more specifically, 
European white man) and that the statute was designed to "protect the white person 
from the influence of all testimony other than that of persons of the same caste." [d. at 
403. As such, "by every sound rule of construction," the terms encompassed by Black, 
Mulatto, or Indian would include "everyone who is not of white blood." [d. The public 
policy reasons were compelling, the court explained, because the Chinese were a "race 
of people whom nature has marked as inferior, and who are incapable of progress or 
intellectual development beyond a certain point." [d. at 405. 
7. 260 U.S. 178 (1922). 
8. [d. at 198. In Ozawa, the appellant, born in Japan, applied for citizenship and, 
except for his race, was "well qualified by character and education for citizenship." [d. 
at 189. The issue, in essence, was whether Ozawa was a "free white person" eligible for 
naturalization under the Naturalization Act, which limited naturalized citizenship to 
"free white persons and to aliens of Mrican nativity and to persons of Mrican descent." 
[d. at 190. The Court held that "white person" was synonymous with "a person of the 
Caucasian race." [d. at 198. The Court, cognizant of the indeterminacy of that racial 
category, quickly added that "Caucasian" did not establish a "sharp line of demarca-
tion" but rather a "zone of more or less debatable ground." [d. at 198. The appellant, 
the Court opined, was clearly of a race "entirely outside the zone on the negative side." 
[d. 
9. 261 U.S. 204 (1923). 
10. [d. at 214-15. In Thind, the appellee, "a high caste Hindu," was denied citizen-
ship. [d. at 206, 215. The issue was whether he fell within the provisions of the Natu-
ralization Act that allowed naturalization to "free white persons, and to aliens of Mri-
can nativity and to persons of African descent." [d. at 207. 
The Court was careful to point out that words of racial classification such as "Cau-
casian" were to be defined in terms of "common speech and not of scientific origin." [d. 
at 208. This occurred despite the Court's view that the racial category of "Caucasian" 
could encompass Hindu and Polynesians among others, given the presence "of the 
Caucasic cast of their features." [d. at 211. However, the Court concluded that even if 
"the blond Scandinavian and the brown Hindu have a common ancestor in the dim 
reaches of antiquity," the Court opined that "the average man knows perfectly well 
that there are unmistakable and profound differences between them today." [d. at 209. 
Thus, all ethnological discussion of racial stock was unnecessary, because "free white 
persons" entailed "words of common speech, to be interpreted in accordance with the 
understanding of common man." [d. at 214. The Court, therefore, held that a Hindu is 
not "a white person" eligible for citizenship. [d. at 215. There was no discussion of 
whether a Hindu was eligible for naturalization on the basis of being "Mrican." 
11. 163 U.S. 537 (1896). 
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petitioner who was seven-eighths Caucasian was classified under the 
hypodescent rule as being "colored."12 
In hindsight, these decisions had less to do with the limitations 
of jurisprudential decisionmaking than with the manner in which 
particular courts approached the racial status quo and the need these 
judges perceived to maintain the existing racial order of white domi-
nance and privilege. The binary construction within their discourse 
was simply a potent means to that end.13 
The binary box the Court constructed in Rice v. Cayetano was in 
response to a challenge to the voting scheme for the election of trus-
tees of the Office of Hawaiian Affairs ("OHA").14 That arrangement 
limited voting to Hawaiians, defined by law as descendants of the in-
habitants of the Hawaiian Islands prior to 1778.15 The petitioner, 
Harold "Freddy" Rice is a Caucasian rancher who traces his family's 
roots in Hawai'i back to the "mid-nineteenth century."16 Rice brought 
suit claiming that these voting limitations violated the Fifteenth and 
Fourteenth Amendments, which prohibit discrimination on the basis 
of race. 17 The respondents, including OHA as an amicus, countered by 
arguing that the voting limitation was not racial, but rather a limita-
tion that flowed from a recognition by the United States of its politi-
cal relationship with aboriginal peoples and its long history of grant-
ing special rights and protections to such people based upon the fact 
that they once owned land now part of the United States. ls 
These articulated distinctions were crucial since the final deter-
mination of the case hinged upon whether the voting issue was de-
fined as one which implicated racial categories and unwarranted ra-
cial discrimination or whether the issue involved the special status of 
indigenous peoples. 19 
12. For a discussion of the rule of hypodescent ("one drop of blood" rule) and the 
construction of race and racial categories, see Neil Gotanda, A Critique of "Our Consti-
tution is Color-Blind," 44 STAN. L. REV. 1,23-26 (1991). 
13. It was no coincidence that only four years before Ozawa and Thind, Congress 
had excluded all natives of Asia from immigrating into the United States. Thind, 261 
U.S. at 215. As the Thind Court remarked, "it is not likely that Congress would be 
willing to accept as citizens a class of persons whom it rejects as immigrants." Id. 
14. Rice u. Cayetano, 528 U.S. 495, 495 (2000). 
15. Id. at 499 ("The smaller class comprises those designated as 'native Hawai-
ians,' defined by statute ... as descendants of not less than one-half part of the races 
inhabiting the Hawaiian Islands prior to 1778."). 
16. Brieffor Petitioner, Rice v. Cayetano, 528 U.S. 495 (2000) (No. 98-818). 
17. Id. at 1. 
18. Brief of Amici Curiae Office of Hawaiian Affairs, et al. as Amici Curiae sup-
porting respondent at 3, Rice, 528 U.S. at 495 [hereinafter OHA Brief] (stating "such 
rights are a function of historical relationship to the land, not race"). 
19. Id. ("This case thus does not involve [suchl racial discrimination, but the power 
of Congress and the State of Hawai'i to fashion a limited program for the aboriginal 
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Reminiscent of Alice's false delimma, the Court's previous racial 
jurisprudence dictated that the legal issue be constructed solely as 
deciding whether Hawaiians were a racial category but not a political 
entity of indigenous people, or a political entity of indigenous people 
but not a racial category.20 
It is my thesis that there is, in fact, a fundamental relationship 
between the notion of racial categories and the legal argument that 
indigenous peoples, such as Hawaiians, have a special political status 
and relationship with the United States. Indeed, doctrinal insistence 
upon the artificial separation reflects the superficiality of the Su-
preme Court's racial jurisprudence. This Article's initial premise is 
that the special political status of native Hawaiian people stems from 
the racial and cultural subordination inherent in their colonization 
and the longstanding assault on their sovereignty. Discussions of 
race, culture, and subordination are, therefore, inseparable from any 
analysis of the harms to this indigenous people that resulted from a 
loss of sovereignty. 
The primary purpose of prohibitions against racial discrimina-
tion contemplated by the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments was 
to remove racial barriers to full and equal participation in the polity 
by American racial groups who identify themselves as rooted in the 
sovereignty of the American nation.21 This goal is entirely different 
from governmental programs instituted to rectify harms to a group of 
people resulting from the forcible loss of their independence and from 
the colonization foisted upon them by the American nation. Thus, 
any consideration of Hawaiian claims to recognition and reparation 
is fundamentally different from the consideration of claims of other 
American racial and ethnic communities. Such claims should be con-
sidered separately. The application of traditional Fourteenth 
Amendment strict scrutiny analysis to Hawaiian sovereignty issues 
is both misplaced and destructive, not only to Hawaiian people but 
also to people of color as a whole. The failure to engage in deeper dia-
logue about the ways in which race and the political status of indige-
nous people intersect leads to confusion at best, and often much 
worse. It also deepens the misunderstanding of both phenomena. 
The arbitrary doctrinal separation of "race" and "special political 
status," forced upon indigenous people and people of color by the cur-
rent Court's approach to race, is yet another example of how "neu-
tral" legal doctrine continues both to create and to exacerbate racial 
and social inequity. Part II explores the narrative of the Supreme 
Court's decision in Rice v. Cayetano. It examines how Rice constructs 
people of Hawai'i. ... "). 
20. See id. at 13-14. 
21. See infra notes 105-21 and accompanying text. 
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whites as the inevitable and rightful rulers of Hawai'i. Part III ex-
plores the doctrinal interrelationship between race and the political 
status of indigenous peoples in the context of the Fourteenth 
Amendment's equal protection clause. 
It is important for me to acknowledge at the outset that, as a 
non-Hawaiian, I hardly have standing to dictate any solution to the 
difficulties the Hawaiian people face in their struggle to reestablish 
sovereignty. Those solutions are for the Hawaiian people to decide for 
themselves. Rather, this Article critically examines how the limita-
tions imposed by the Supreme Court's decision in Rice, and the bi-
ases imbedded in the law itself, impinge directly on the freedom and 
dignity not only of the Hawaiian people, but also of all subordinated 
groups and peoples. 
II. THE HISTORICAL NARRATIVE OF THE RICE V. CAYETANO DECISION 
If there is a textbook case in which majoritarian perspectives 
and racial norms masquerade as neutral narrative, it is the Rice de-
cision. By the third paragraph of the decision, Justice Kennedy, for 
the Court, described petitioner Rice as "a Hawaiian in a well-
accepted sense of the term" because Rice is a "citizen of Hawaii.'>22 
The issue of who is included in the universe of "well-accepted" is, of 
course, subjective. In the case of Justice Kennedy, it is also misin-
formed, biased, and plainly wrong. For the majority of the people of 
Hawai'i-native Hawaiians and non-Hawaiians alike-Freddy Rice 
is by no stretch of the imagination "Hawaiian."23 The majority's blithe 
inability to adopt any perspective other than the dominant norm in-
fects the entire decision. 
Perhaps it is in the construction of the history of Hawai'i that 
this inability (and unwillingness) is most stark. In retelling history, 
the Court relies upon two works of Hawaiian history written many 
decades ago. 24 The Court then begins to create a remarkable narra-
tive, essentially retelling the favorite American fairy tale of how the 
white man "civilized" the savage-this time in the context of Hawai'i. 
22. Ricev. Cayetano, 528 U.S. 495, 499 (2000). 
23. Honolulu Advertiser, a conservative daily newspaper in Hawai'i, responded in 
an editorial by stating ''Well-accepted where? Certainly not in Hawaii." "Rice": How 
Well Does Court Understand Us?, HONOLULU ADVERTISER, Mar. 2, 2000, at A8. 
24. The Court relies almost exclusively on two works written by non-Hawaiians: L. 
FUCHS, HAWAII PONO: AN ETHNIC AND POLITICAL HISTORY, (1961); R. KUYKENDALL, 
THE HAWAIIAN KiNGDOM, (1938); (1953); and (1967); see also Rice, 528 U.S. at 500. In 
that context, Justice Stevens in his dissent is right in his observation that the majority 
had failed to recognize the import of Hawaiian history, but wrong in his view that the 
majority had "splendidly acknowledged" the history itself. See id. at 534 (Stevens, J., 
dissenting). The basic problem was that the majority had recognized the importance 
of Hawaiian "history" as the majority falsely constructed it-a narrative of Western 
superiority and "reverse discrimination." Id. 
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A. The Court's Construction of Hawaiian History25 
The Court begins its tale in language that is both stereotypic and 
patronizing. The Hawaiian people found "beauty and pleasure in 
their island existence, but life was not altogether idyllic"26 because 
there was bloody internecine warfare and kings and other high offi-
cials "could order the death or sacrifice of any subject."27 One could 
also, of course, characterize the sum of early European history as a 
time when everyday existence was marred by brutal internecine war-
fare and kings could order the death of any subject. Nevertheless, 
this patronizing perspective sets the theme of how the "civilizing in-
fluence" of the West affected Hawai'i.28 It also runs as a not-so-subtle 
subtext throughout the opinion. 
The Court characterized the nineteenth century missionaries not 
as cultural intruders but simply as those who "sought to teach Ha-
waiians to abandon religious beliefs and customs that were contrary 
to Christian teachings and practices."29 Indeed, when the Court re-
viewed the increasing encroachment by Western interests during the 
nineteenth century, the majority characterized these events not as a 
greedy and hostile invasion, but rather as a benign "story of increas-
ing involvement of westerners in the economic and political affairs of 
the Kingdom"30 such that "[r]ights to land" became a principal con-
cern for both Hawaiians and non-Hawaiians.31 
The Court described the system of Hawaiian approaches to land 
use and ownership rooted in centuries of tradition and culture as 
feudal, although traditional Hawaiian concepts of land ownership are 
much more than simply "feudal.,,32 As a result of this pressure to re-
define land rights-ostensibly as the Court would have it, by the en-
tire population of Hawai'i-the Court concluded that in 1848 a "fun-
damental and historic division" of land, known as "the Great 
Mahele," legitimated private land ownership and allowed foreigners 
to own land.33 The exploitation, corruption, and greed by Western in-
25. With Professor Eric Yamamoto, I have also articulated a similar critique of the 
Court's recitation of Hawaiian history. See Eric. K. Yamamoto & Chris Iijima, The 
Colonizer's Story: The Supreme Court Violates Native Hawaiian Sovereignty-Again, 3 
COLORLINES MAG. 6 (2000). 
26. Rice, 528 U.S. at 500. 
27. Id. 
28. See supra note 25 and accompanying text. 
29. Rice, 528 U.S. at 501. 
30. Id. 
31. Id. 
32. Id. But see infra notes 43-47 and accompanying text. 
33. Rice, 528 U.S. at 503. It is significant that the Court refers to "The Mahele" as 
"The Great Mahele." The adjective "great" was formerly used, but has been excised 
from the description by Hawaiian and other scholars because it was anything but 
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terests, resulting in massive tracts of Hawaiian land quickly being 
taken over by non-Hawaiians, was blandly and euphemistically 
characterized by the Court as land ownership merely becoming "con-
centrated."34 
The Court then observed that there were "tensions" between an 
"anti-Western, pro-native bloc in the government,"35 described by the 
Court as a group wanting monarchical control and no universal suf-
frage, and "Western business interests and property owners.,,36 In the 
Court's construction of history, the latter group had to be the cham-
pions of enlightened democracy.37 Indeed, in a remarkable example of 
turning history on its head, the Court recounted a tale of how Queen 
Lili'uokalani was repulsed in an attempt to restore "monarchical con-
trol over the House of Nobles and limiting the franchise to Hawaiian 
subjects."38 According to the Court's recitation, it was Hawaiians who 
attempted an illegal overthrow, not the United States! Queen 
Lili'uokalani, in fact, was reacting to the forced imposition of a 
"Bayonet Constitution" in 1887, a purported new rule of law that 
greatly restricted the voting rights for Hawaiians due to property re-
quirements, and disproportionately gave political power to whites 
and foreigners. 39 
The monarchy, according to the Court, was simply replaced by a 
provisional government and the Queen then, for reasons unexplained 
by the Court, "could not resume her former place."4o Despite Presi-
dent Cleveland's displeasure at the "actions of the American Minis-
ter"41 in establishing the provisional government, Justice Kennedy 
explained that the Republic of Hawai'i emerged in 1894, after which, 
the Queen voluntarily abdicated.42 
The Court then recounted that President McKinley-in what the 
Court clearly accepts as a lawful and orderly action-signed the 1898 
Joint Resolution annexing the Hawaiian Islands as a territory of the 
United States.43 The Republic of Hawai'i ceded all former Crown, 
government, and public lands, according to the majority, and only 
"great" for the Hawaiian people. See infra notes 63-65 and accompanying text. 
34. Rice, 528 U.S. 503; see also infra notes 49-50 and accompanying text. 
35. Rice, 528 U.S. at 504. 
36. Id. at 506. 
37. See id. ("The conflicts came to the fore in 1887," when the Hawaiian Prime 
Minister was forced to resign and a new Constitution "reduced the power of the mon-
archy, and extended the right to vote to non-Hawiaiians.") 
38. Id. at 504. 
39. See infra notes 55-66 and accompanying text. 
40. Rice, 528 U.S. at 505. 
41. Id. 
42. Id. at 504. 
43. Id. at 505. 
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"two years later, the Hawaiian Organic Act established the Territory 
of Hawaii."44 
In a glaring and most telling omission, the Court never acknowl-
edged that the creation of OHA itself, as well as its voting limitation 
at issue, resulted from a vote by the entire multiracial population of 
Hawai'i.45 Moreover, the Court barely mentioned the extraordinary 
Congressional Joint Resolution's Apology of 1993 to the native Ha-
waiian people for the United States's involvement in the illegal over-
throw of Hawai'i. When the Court did mention the Joint Resolution 
in passing, its significance was entirely downplayed.46 Justice Ken-
nedy described the Apology Resolution simply as a review of "the role 
of [the American] Minister Stevens," and an accounting of "events in 
some detail."47 The fact that Congress admitted explicitly that the 
44. [d. 
45. OHA Brief, supra note 18, at 10. OHA was created by the delegates to the 
1978 Constitutional Convention and was ratified by all of Hawai'i's citizens in the N 0-
vember 1978 general election. See HAw. CONST. art. XII, § 5 (creating OHA to "hold 
title to all real and personal property ... in trust for native Hawaiians and Hawaiians" 
and for a board of trustees elected by beneficiaries of the trust). 
46. See Rice, 528 U.S. at 505 ("Congress passed a Joint Resolution recounting the 
events in some detail and offering an apology to the native Hawaiian people."). 
47. [d. One could interpret the joint resolution to acknowledge the 100th Anniver-
sary of the January 17, 1893 overthrow of the Kingdom of Hawai'i as a document in 
which the United States essentially reasserted its dominion over Hawai'i. See Pub. L. 
103-150, 107 Stat. 1510 (1993) ("Apology Resolution of 1993"). However, it is also a 
remarkable document in which Congress expressly acknowledged the United States 
complicity in the illegal overthrow of the Kingdom. Among other items, the Apology 
Resolution of 1993 made the following points: 
1. Before the arrival of Europeans in 1778, Hawai'i had a sophisticated and 
organized society; 
2. That from 1826 through 1893, the United States recognized the Kingdom 
of Hawai'i and extended it full diplomatic recognition; 
3. That in 1893, the American Minister, John L. Stevens, "conspired with a 
small group of non-Hawaiian residents ... to overthrow the indigenous and 
lawful Government of Hawaii"; 
4. That "in pursuance of the conspiracy" armed naval forces of the United 
States "invade[dl the sovereign Hawaiian nation" in 1893 in order to "intimi-
date Queen Liluokalani" and that "American and European sugar planters, 
descendants of missionaries, and financiers deposed the Hawaiian monarchy 
and proclaimed the establishment of a Provisional Government"; 
5. That the recognition extended by the United States to this unlawful 
government was in violation of treaties between the two nations; 
6. That Queen Lil'uokalani was forced to abdicate to avoid bloodshed; 
7. That as a result of a congressional investigation concluding that U.S. dip-
lomatic and military authorities had abused their authority, Minister Ste-
vens was recalled and President Cleveland called for the undoing of the 
"substantial wrong" and a "restoration of the Hawaiian monarchy"; 
8. That in subsequent Congressional investigations, although the illegal 
"Provisional Government was able to obscure the role of the United States in 
the illegal overthrow of the Hawaiian monarchy, it was unable to rally the 
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Hawaiian people never directly relinquished their inherent sover-
eignty as a people or their claims to their native lands to the United 
States, is neither addressed nor even acknowledged by the majority 
opinion. 48 In this light, it is particularly troubling to note the follow-
ing colloquy at oral argument between Justice Scalia and the attor-
ney for Petitioner Rice, Theodore B. Olson, with respect to the his-
torical recounting of events in the Apology Resolution: 
Justice Scalia: You mean you're contradicting the congressional 
resolution that said we're guilty? Do we have to accept that-does-
that resolution as an accurate description of history? 
Mr. Olson: Of course, and this Court ... 
Justice Scalia: Can't Congress make history? (Laughter) 
Mr. Olson: Congress does make history, but Congress, of course, 
can't change history. I'm not-we're not accepting everything that's 
in the so-called Apology Resolution.49 
If this Court's paean to nineteenth century imperialism, pre-
sented as historical facts, were not bad enough, the Court's discus-
support from two-thirds of the Senate to ratify a treaty of annexation"; 
9. That in 1894, the Provisional Government proclaimed itself the Republic 
of Hawaii and in 1895 forced Queen Lil'uokanlani to abdicate; 
10. That the "self-declared Republic of Hawaii" through the Newlands Joint 
Resolution of Congress providing for the annexation of Hawai'i in 1898 ceded 
1,800,000 acres of crown land "without the consent of or compensation to the 
Native Hawaiian people of Hawaii or their sovereign government"; 
11. That the "indigenous Hawaiian people never directly relinquished their 
claims to their inherent sovereignty as a people or over their native lands"; 
12. That "the health and well-being of the Native Hawaiian people is intrin-
sically tied to their deep feelings and attachment to the land"; 
13. That the economic and social changes over the last century have been 
"devastating to the population and to the health and well-being of the Ha-
waiian people"; 
14. That Native Hawaiian people are "determined to preserve, develop and 
transmit to future generations their ancestral territory, and their cultural 
identity in accordance with their own spiritual and traditional beliefs, cus-
toms, practices, language, and social institutions." Apology Resolution of 
1993, Pub. L. 103-150, 107 Stat. 1510-13 (1993). 
48. Perhaps, more significantly, the Apology Resolution apologizes for not only the 
illegal overthrow, but the "deprivation of the rights of Native Hawaiians to self-
determination"; and commits the United States to acknowledging "the ramifications of 
the overthrow of the Kingdom of Hawaii, in order to provide a proper foundation for 
reconciliation efforts between the United States and the Native Hawaiian people." [d. 
at 1513. 
49. Ka Wai Ola 0 OHA, Rice v. Cayetano Transcript Supplement (Volume 17, No. 
1, January, 2000) [hereinafter "Supplement Transcript"]; United States Supreme 
Court Official Transcript, Rice v. Cayetano, No. 98-818, 1999 WL 955376, at *14 [here-
inafter "Westlaw Transcript"]. The identification of Justice Scalia appears only in the 
first source. However, the colloquy appears in both sources. 
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sion of two important features of Hawaiian history starkly reveals 
the racial, historical, and political biases of the Court in another 
troubling way. The first was the devastation of the Hawaiian people 
by the introduction of Western diseases, which threatened to destroy 
the entire indigenous population.50 The Court concluded that these 
illnesses "no doubt" were an initial cause of the "despair, disen-
chantment, and despondency" of the descendants of the early Hawai-
ian people. 51 Loss of sovereignty, exploitation and eviction from their 
own land, denigration and outlawing of language and culture are un-
noticed, unmentioned, and unconsidered by a Court clinging to its 
own version of reality. 
The next paragraph may be the most telling of all, however. The 
Court concluded its factual background by noting that Hawaiian his-
tory is marked by the influx of many immigrants. 52 It specifically al-
luded to the "Chinese, Portuguese, Japanese, and Filipino" migra-
tions to Hawai'i. 53 There is, however, one group never referred to nor 
described as an "immigrant" group. That group is constructed differ-
ently from immigrants because throughout the opinion it is assumed 
to be the rightful and natural heir to the land of Hawai'i. It is not in-
significant that the Court refers to the Tahitians as the first Polyne-
sian settlers of Hawai'i and consistently also refers to white immi-
grants as settlers.54 This latter group-apparently never immi-
grants-consists of white missionaries and other "settlers." Their de-
scendants are implicitly constructed in this way as the natural heirs 
to Hawai'i. In other words, these "nonimmigrants" are the ancestors 
of Freddy Rice. 
B. The Counter-Narrative of Hawaiian History55 
The Court's recitation of Hawaiian history eerily confirms the 
observation of Professor Haunani-Kay Trask that "so much of what 
passes for Hawaiian history [is] nothing more than a series of politi-
cal myths created by foreigners and designed to disparage our peo-
ple."56 Indeed, as Trask prophetically observed: 
50. Rice, 528 U.S. at 506. 
51. [d. 
52. [d. 
53. [d. ("The other important feature of Hawaiian demographics to be noted is the 
immigration to the islands by people of many difference races and cultures."). 
54. See id. at 500 ("The origins of the first Hawaiian people and the date they 
reached the islands are not established with certainty, but the usual assumption is 
that they were Polynesians who voyaged from Tahiti ... "). 
55. It should be noted here that my purpose in presenting this "counter-narrative" 
is certainly not to purport to give a complete account of Hawaiian history, but merely 
to illustrate and to emphasize distortions contained in the Rice decision. 
56. HAUNANI-KAY TRASK, FROM A NATIVE DAUGHTER 129 (2d ed. 1998). 
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[T]here is always that particular variant of racism that fashions 
America's moral stupidity: vociferous denial of the presence, unique 
histories, and self-determination of America's conquered Natives. 
To Hawaiians, haole Americans seem to cherish their ignorance of 
other nations (especially conquered peoples who live wretched lives 
all around them) as a sign of American individualism.57 
The history of Hawai'i is far from the benign fairy tale the Court 
attempts to pass off as historical fact. The story of the United 
States's involvement in Hawai'i actually is a tale of the usurpation of 
a stable society and a rich culture through deception and force, 
power, and greed. 
While Native Hawaiians may have found "beauty and pleasure 
in their island existence,"58 it is perhaps more accurate to character-
ize their existence as a society that lived in harmony with 
akua(gods), 'aina (land), and kanaka(humans).59 Traditional Hawai-
ian society was an intricate system in which akua provided kanaka 
with 'aina and all that it provided. In exchange, kanaka were stew-
ards of the (aina, obligated to care for what akua provided as well as 
to honor the akua. Thus, it was the duty of the ali'i nui (king/queen) 
to balance these forces. Contrary to the Court's simplistic and mis-
leading notion that kings "could order the death or sacrifice of any 
subject,"60 the role of the ali'i nui was much more complex because: 
ali'i nui were the protectors of the maka'ainana . .. should famine 
arise, the ati'i nui were held at fault and deposed. Alternatively, 
should an ali'i nui be stingy and cruel to the commoners, the culti-
vators of the (aina, he or she would ... be struck down, usually by 
the people.61 
Moreover, the land system was hardly feudal in any accurate 
historical sense. The maka'ainana cultivated the land but they were 
neither bound to a cruel ali'i nui nor were they obligated to stay on 
alloted land, "unlike feudal European economic and political ar-
rangement ... the maka'ainana neither owed military service to the 
ali'i nor were they bound to the land."62 Thus, an interdependence ex-
isted in pre-Western Hawaiian society whereby commoners were free 
to move in order to live under an ali'i of their choosing, while ali'i in-
creased their status and prosperity by attracting more people to their 
moku (domain).63 The result was to create an incentive for the leaders 
57. [d. at 18. Professor Trask's book contains a brief but powerful history of Ha-
wai'i. [d. at 4-19. 
58. Rice, 528 U.S. at 500. 
59. LILIKALA KAME'ELEIHIW A, NATIVE LAND AND FOREIGN DESIRES 25-26 (1992). 
60. Rice, 528 U.S. at 500. 
61. KAME'ELEIHIWA, supra note 59, at 26. 
62. TRASK, supra note 56, at 5. 
63. [d. 
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of Hawaiian society to provide well for the welfare of their constitu-
ents.54 In 1848, under pressure from missionaries and Western busi-
ness interests, Kamehameha III approved a plan known as "The 
Mahele." This radical reform ended the traditional land system and 
gave Westerners the ability to purchase land.65 Much more than just 
"concentrating" land ownership as Justice Kennedy characterized it, 
the Mahele "opened the way to the same massive loss of native land 
that occurred among Indians in North America."66 By 1888, it is esti-
mated that "three-quarters of all arable land was controlled by 
haole."67 In fact, the "tensions" to which the Court's opinion so 
obliquely referred culminated in 1887 when King David Kalakaua, 
yielding to pressure from Western business interests signed what be-
came known as the "Bayonet Constitution." This document gave the 
voting franchise to Americans and Europeans irrespective of citizen-
ship. Moreover, the property requirement for voting was so high that 
most Native Hawaiians could not vote in their own land.6B 
Subsequently, upon her ascension to the throne in 1892, and 
fearing the disenfranchisement of her people, Queen Lili'uokalani 
considered a new constitution limiting the vote to Hawaiian-born or 
naturalized citizens.69 Using the rumors of such a new constitution, a 
small group of conspirators, white businessmen who controlled the 
economy, plotted the overthrow of the monarchy and annexation to 
the United States. 70 In 1893, the conspirators, with the active support 
and participation of the United States Minister, John L. Stevens, and 
the United States Marines, took control of the government building 
and declared a provisional government that immediately was recog-
nized by Minister Stevens.71 Determined to prevent bloodshed, 
64. [d.; see also Amicus Brief of State Council of Hawaiian Homestead Associa-
tions, Hui Kako'o 'Aina Ho'opulapula, Kalama'ula Homestead Asociation, and Hawai-
ian Homelands Commission [hereinafter Hawaiian Homestead Brief] at 4 (stating that 
reciprocal relationships wove a fabric of mutual obligation between ali'i and 
maka'ainana). "Land use developed around geographic units extending from mountain 
to ocean" (ahupua'a), and since there was an interrelationship between farmer and 
fisherman, there was "an extended family network known as 'ohana.'" [d. at 4-5. The 
amicus brief specifically noted that the Hawaiian land tenure system was unique and 
"mischaracterized as feudal." [d. at 4. 
65. Hawaiian Homestead Brief, at 7. 
66. [d. at 7-8. In the 1890 census, of nearly 90,000 total population in Hawai'i, a 
relatively small number of Westerners owned over a million acres. [d. (quoting MEL-
ODY K. MACKENZIE, NATIVE HAWAIIAN RIGHTS HANDBOOK 10 (1991) [hereinafter 
HANDBOOK]). Moreover, the Hawaiian population had been decimated by two thirds. 
[d. at 10. 
67. TRASK, supra note 56, at 7. 
68. HANDBOOK, supra note 66, at 10. 
69. [d. 
70. [d. at 11-12. 
71. [d. at 12. Despite the Court's implication that Minister Stevens acted unilater-
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Lili'uokalani relinquished her authority. On February 1, 1893, the 
United States placed the provisional government under its protection 
and "hoisted the American flag over Hawai'i."72 
President Harrison's pro-annexation administration was re-
placed in 1893 by the administration of President Grover Cleveland, 
who opposed annexation, condemned the misuse of American power, 
and called for the restoration ofthe monarchy.73 
The following year, a constitutional convention, dominated and 
controlled by the provisional government, created voting qualifica-
tions so stringent that few Hawaiians and no Asians could vote. 74 The 
"Republic of Hawai'i" was proclaimed by the usurping Western inter-
ests.75 Despite the protests of Lili'uokalani, major foreign powers rec-
ognized the new "republic," and it claimed title to the almost two mil-
lion acres of former Government and Crown Lands without any com-
pensation.76 After a brief uprising by those loyal to the heir, Queen 
Lili'uokalani involuntarily abdicated while confined under house ar-
rest and in fear for the lives of her supporters.77 
Nevertheless, a two-thirds majority of the United States Senate 
could not be mustered to approve a treaty of annexation. In 1898, 
therefore, Hawai'i was "annexed" by means of a joint congressional 
resolution. 78 The Republic of Hawai'i then ceded almost two million 
acres ofland to the United States without compensation. 79 This entire 
transfer from independent Kingdom to annexed territory transpired 
despite overwhelming opposition to annexation among the Hawaiian 
people.80 
ally, without support by the United States government, one of the conspirators was 
expressly told by the Secretary of the Navy on a visit to Washington, D.C. that the 
Harrison Administration would look "sympathetically" upon an annexation proposal of 
Hawai'i to the United States. [d. at 11. 
72. [d. 
73. [d. 
74. [d. at 12. 
75. [d. at 13. 
76. [d. 
77. [d. 
78. OHA Brief, supra note 18, at 6. It should be noted that the annexation of Ha-
wai'i by joint resolution outside of the treaty-making power of the Senate and Execu-
tive, and in the absence of a plebiscite of the acquired territory is unprecedented and 
probably unconstitutional. Although Texas was annexed by joint resolution in 1845, it 
was in the context of the congressional power to admit new states. HANDBOOK, supra 
note 66, at 24 n.100. 
79. Hawaiian Homestead Brief, supra note 64, at 9. In 1910, Queen Lili'uokalani 
unsuccessfully sued to recover the Crown Lands. Liluokalani v. United States, 45 Ct. 
Cl. 418 (1910). 
80. Hawaiian Homestead Brief, at 9. More than 21,000 Hawaiians signed petitions 
opposing annexation at a time when the entire population numbered 40,000. [d. at 9 
n.28. There are some who estimate the petition signatures even higher into the 30,000 
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It is important to understand the backdrop and context of this 
early history to understand the basis for the major events in Hawai-
ian history that followed including: 
1. The Hawaiian Homes Commission Act of 1920, which in recogni-
tion of the economic, political, and psychological dislocation that 
the dispossession of Hawaii had caused to native Hawaiians, set 
aside 200,000 acres of former kingdom lands for native Hawai-
ians;81 
2. The requirement, as a condition for statehood admission, that 
Hawai'i accept responsibility for the Hawaiian Home Lands;82 
3. The additional requirement by the Admission Act to hold 1.2 mil-
lion acres of ceded Government and Crown Lands in trust for the 
"betterment of the conditions of the native Hawaiians" among other 
purposes;83 
4. The 1978 creation of ORA and its voting restriction by constitu-
tional amendment, and its ratification in a general election by all of 
Hawai'i's registered voters.84 
Moreover, it is against the background of this historical context 
that the continued desecration of Hawaiian 'aina and culture must be 
considered. It also provides perspective to understand better the Ha-
waiian people's call for self-determination and sovereignty.85 Yet the 
range and above. See, e.g., Erin Texeira, Native Hawaiians Gather at Capitol to Bring 
Attention to Plight, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Aug. 9, 1998, at 14A; Anti-Annexation 
Petitions, at http://www.alohaquest.com/scripts/antLannexation_petitions.html (last 
visited Oct. 3, 2000). The motivation driving the intense desire to acquire Hawai'i in 
the face of opposition, not only in Hawai'i as well as in the Senate, is understandable 
when looking at its historical context. In 1898, the Spanish American War was being 
waged for an American presence in the Far East. Hawai'i as well as the Philippines 
became highly valuable and strategic military territories. See HANDBOOK, supra note 
66, at 14. 
81. Hawaiian Homes Commission Act, ch. 42, 42 Stat 108 (1921). 
82. The Admission Act of March 18, 1959, Pub. L. No. 86-3, § 4, 73 Stat. 4 (1959). 
83. [d. § 5(0 (conveying 1.2 million acres oflands to be held in trust for the follow-
ing purposes: the support of public schools and educational institutions, the better-
ment of the conditions of native Hawaiians, for the development of farm and home 
ownership, for the making of public improvements, and for the provision of lands for 
public use). 
84. HAw. CONST., art XII, §§ 5, 6 (added by the Constitutional Convention of 1978 
and ratified by general election on Nov. 7, 1978) (establishing the Office of Hawaiian 
Affairs and its Board of Trustees "elected by qualified voters who are Hawaiians, as 
provided by law"). 
85. See, e.g., HANDBOOK, supra note 66, at 77-98 (discussing various groups, is-
sues, and events relating to the struggle for Hawaiian sovereignty); Susan Essoyan, 
First Hawaiians Seek Return to Some Sovereignty, L.A. TIMES, July 22, 1992, at A5; 
Robert Reinhold, A Century After Queen's Overthrow, Talk of Sovereignty Shakes Ha-
waii, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 8, 1992, at 24; Michael Sangiacomo, Hawaiian Groups Seek 
Self-Rule, PLAIN DEALER (CLEVELAND, OHIO), Feb. 7, 1994, at 7A. 
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Court pointedly refused to acknowledge this context anywhere in its 
opinion. 
III. THE MISUNDERSTANDING OF RACE IN RICE V. CAYETANO 
The Court opened its legal analysis with the observation that the 
Fifteenth Amendment was enacted to ensure emancipated slaves the 
right to vote, "lest they be denied the civil and political capacity to 
protect their new freedom."86 The Court then opined that the amend-
ment's terms transcend "the particular controversy which was the 
immediate impetus for its enactment" to grant "protection to all 
persons."87 The Fifteenth Amendment, according to Justice Kennedy, 
reaffirmed "the equality of races at the most basic level of the democ-
ratic process, the exercise of the voting franchise."BB 
This doctrinal introduction emphasizes the empty formalism of 
the Court's conclusion. Justice Kennedy never returns to the underly-
ing reason why "protection" of the voting franchise is so basic. As his 
majority opinion acknowledges, the Fifteenth Amendment's "protec-
tion" was premised on the necessity for newly empowered African 
American former slaves to guard against the reinstitution of subor-
dination.89 Equality of participation in the democratic process thus 
was hardly a mathematical abstraction, but rather a means to help 
ensure against unjust domination of one group by another. It is in 
this context that the analysis of the Fifteenth Amendment cases 
must be viewed-context that the Court again completely ignores. 
The Court specifically analogized the OHA voting mechanism to 
the circumstances of two Fifteenth Amendment cases, Guinn v. 
United States90 and Terry v. Adams.91 In Guinn, Oklahoma exempted 
voters whose ancestors were previously eligible to vote before Janu-
ary 1, 1866, from a literacy requirement for voting eligibility, effec-
tively exempting many white voters from the literacy requirement. 92 
The resulting reality was that African Americans were almost exclu-
sively required to conform to the literacy requirements. The Supreme 
Court found that the requirement was a racial exclusion prohibited 
by the Fifteenth Amendment.93 
86. Rice v. Cayetano, 528 U.S. 495, 512 (2000). The Fifteenth Amendment reads in 
relevant part, "The right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not be denied or 
abridged by the United States or by any State on account of race, color, or previous 
condition of servitude." U.S. CONST. amend XV, § 1. 
87. Rice, 528 U.S. at 512. 
88. Id. 
89. See id. 
90. 238 U.S. 347 (1915). 
91. 345 U.S. 461 (1953). 
92. Guinn, 238 U.S. at 357. 
93. Rice, 528 U.S. at 513 (citing Guinn, 238 U.S. at 364-65). 
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In Terry, African Americans were excluded from participating in 
the primary of a "private" Texas association, whose handpicked can-
didates always became the choices of the Democratic Party. The 
Court held this exclusion was in violation of the Fifteenth Amend-
ment as it stripped African Americans of the power to select their lo-
cal county officials.94 
Clearly in the cases relied upon by the Court, the Fifteenth 
Amendment protected politically dis empowered African Americans 
from the attempt by the politically dominant racial group to keep 
them from gaining political, civil, and social equality. Justice Ste-
vens's dissent in Rice noted the Court's glaring failure to analyze the 
relevance of these circumstances to the Rice situation.95 The majority 
simply ignored "overwhelming differences" between the context of 
Fifteenth Amendment case law and the "unique history of Hawai'i."96 
Indeed, "the former [recalled] an age of abject discrimination against 
an insular minority in the old South; the latter at long last [yielding] 
the 'political consensus' the majority claims it seeks.'>97 Stevens 
added: 
[T]he voting laws held invalid under the Fifteenth Amendment in 
all of the cases cited by the majority were fairly and properly 
viewed through a specialized lens-a lens honed in specific detail to 
reveal the realities of time, place, and history behind the voting re-
strictions being tested. 
That lens not only fails to clarify, it fully obscures the realities of 
this case, virtually the polar opposite of the Fifteenth Amendment 
cases on which the Court relies ... [that] have no application to a 
system designed to empower politically the remaining members of 
a class of once sovereign, indigenous people. 98 
The simplistic formalism of the majority's use of Fifteenth 
Amendment jurisprudence also is reflected in the superficiality of the 
Court's treatment of race. The Court first declared that Hawaiian 
ancestry is a proxy for race because the various state and federal 
statutes relating to Hawaiian people "reflect the ... effort to preserve 
[a] commonality of people"99 to "treat the early Hawaiians as a dis-
tinct people, commanding their own recognition and respect."IOO Later 
in its opinion, however, the Court declared that "[o]ne of the principle 
reasons race is treated as a forbidden classification is that it demeans 
94. 345 U.S. at 462, 469. 
95. Rice, 528 U.S. at 546 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
96. [d. 
97. [d. 
98. [d. at 540. 
99. [d. at 515. 
100. [d. 
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the dignity and worth of a person to be judged by ancestry instead of 
by his or her own merit and essential qualities."1Ol Due to a basic in-
ability or unwillingness to understand the significance of juxtaposing 
these two ideas, the Court neither understands nor synthesizes the 
different meanings and uses of race. That is, the majority fails to un-
derstand that race can be a marker, a category that entails recogni-
tion and respect of a people whose history has been one of demeaning 
subordination, while race can simultaneously be used as a marker by 
a dominant group in order to subjugate another. 
Professor Eric Yamamoto has noted that the Supreme Court re-
gards all racial classifications in the "same skeptical legal fashion, 
regardless of whether a classification is designed to end a white-
controlled racial caste system or perpetuate it."102 To the current 
Court, all that matters is whether race is involved. Scrutinizing the 
context of racial identities, racial histories, and racial dynamics is ir-
relevant. lo3 Yet, one cannot discuss race without discussing those is-
sues. As many people writing about race now understand, racial his-
tory and dynamics are the criteria that actually define race. 
The location and understanding of race are no longer found in 
"definitions of biological characteristics, historical commonality or es-
sential identity," or as an "attribute within people," but rather it is "a 
complex set of relations between people."104 Race is a fluid social con-
struction used for various and different social and political ends. The 
meanings and ultimate definitions of race have been constructed to 
create and maintain white dominated racial hierarchies on the one 
hand,105 and subordinated people of color to contest the associations 
that hierarchy has imposed on the other.106 
Writing about the case of Hernandez v. Texas,lo7 in which the 
101. [d. at 517. 
102. ERIC K. YAMAMOTO, INTERRACIAL JUSTICE, CONFLICT & RECONCILIATION IN 
POST-CIVIL RIGHTS AMERICA 45 (Richard Delgado & Jean Stefancic eds., 1999). 
103. See id. 
104. Jayne Chong-Soon Lee, Navigating the Topology of Race, 46 STAN. L. REv. 747, 
751 (1994). For more extensive discussions of race as a legal and social construction, 
see MICHAEL OMI & HOWARD WINANT, RACIAL FORMATION IN THE UNITED STATES 55 
(1994) ("[R]ace [is] an unstable and 'decentered' complex of social meanings."); Neil 
Gotanda, A Critique of "Our Constitution is Colorblind," 44 STAN. L. REV. 1, 4 (1991) 
(noting that race is a socially constructed category and not a natural or scientific one). 
For a brief discussion of the Court's ideological approach to racial jurisprudence, see 
YAMAMOTO, supra note 102, at 44-47. 
105. See supra notes 7-9 and accompanying text. 
106. See, e.g., IAN F. HANEY LOPEZ, WHITE BY LAW: THE LEGAL CONSTRUCTION OF 
RACE 165-67 (1996) (stating that race is a relationship in which different groups are 
defined against one another such that White becomes a positive mirror image against 
which a category of non-Whites which is defined as its negative opposite). 
107. 347 U.S. 475, 482 (1954) (holding the Fourteenth Amendment extended to pro-
vide equal protection to persons of Mexican descent). 
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Warren Court extended Fourteenth Amendment protection to La-
tino/as, Professor Ian Haney Lopez observed that the protection was 
extended not on the ground that Mexican Americans constituted a 
protected racial group, but because Mexican Americans belonged to a 
class that suffered racial discrimination in Texas. IOB Lopez points out 
how the biological definition of race could not be neatly applied to 
Mexican Americans. In fact, "all concerned parties agreed ... [they] 
were White; though officially so, the dark skin and features of many 
Mexican Americans seemingly demonstrated that they were non-
White; though ... not neatly categorized as Red, Yellow, or Black."!09 
Thus, it was "in the attitudes toward and the treatment of Mexican 
Americans, rather than human biology, that one must locate the ori-
gins of Mexican-American racial identity."llo Lopez concluded: 
Any biological basis to race has now been soundly repudiated. In-
stead, races are human inventions in which notions of transcend en-
tal, innate similarity, and difference are assigned to physical fea-
tures and ancestry. The assignment of racial boundaries arises in 
the form of social practices, and so reveals itself to be a highly con-
tingent, historically specific process. 
In fact, no more accurate test could be fashioned to establish 
whether Mexican Americans, or any other group, constitute a race. 
Race is not biological or fixed by nature; it is instead a question of 
social belief. ... [W]hether a racial group exists is always a local 
question to be answered in terms of community attitudes. 111 
Conversely, racial identity can be used to help preserve the com-
monality of a subjugated people.112 Put more concretely: 
Moreover, the word "race"-or rather the Spanish equivalent 
raza-has special significance for Latino/as in the United States, 
108. Ian F. Haney Lopez, Race and Erasure, in RICHARD DELGADO & JEAN 
STEPHANCIC, THE LATINO/A CONDITION 180-81 (1998) [hereinafter LATINO/A CONDI-
TIONS]. 
109. Id. at 183. 
110. Id. 
111. Id. at 184. In Shaare Tefila Congregation v. Cobb, 481 U.S. 615 (1987), the 
Supreme Court held that discrimination against people of the Jewish religion was ra-
cial discrimination because "the question ... is not whether Jews are considered to be 
a separate race by today's standards, but whether at the time [section] 1982 was 
adopted, Jews constituted a group of people Congress intended to protect." Id. at 617. 
112. See Mary Coombs, Interrogating Identity, 2 AFR.-AM. L. & POL'y REP. 222, 226 
(1995) (defining blackness as the "experience[] of racial subordination," "knowledge 
of ... African American culture," "commitment to ... community," and loyalty "to es-
sential credos"); Chris K. Iijima, The Era of We-Construction: Reclaiming the Politics of 
Asian Pacific American Identity and Reflections on the Critique of the Black / White 
Paradigm, 29 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 47,53-54 (1997) (observing that the political 
character of a subordinated group's racial identity is, in part, its reaction to white su-
premacist ideology). 
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particularly for Chicanos. Raza evokes a primeval and mystical un-
ion with the indigenous people that populated the North American 
expanse of Aztlan. The natives of Aztlan spread south and eventu-
ally formed the Nahuatl tribes living in Mexico as the European 
conquest began. The concept of race also has political connotations. 
"Raza" is the name taken by the organizations that initiated and 
have continued the struggle for political, social, and economic em-
powerment of the Chicano community.1l3 
People of color understand how racial dynamics have influenced 
every aspect of our collective and individual lives. Thus the Court's 
conclusion that "inquiry into ancestral lines is not consistent with re-
spect based on the unique personality each of us possesses" only un-
derscores a fundamental lack of understanding of race's meaning and 
significance.1l4 For the Court, the evil of racism "is no longer individ-
ual and institutional acts of white supremacy but, rather, [merely] 
the recognition of racial differences."1l5 Thus, rather than look at the 
specific and particularized harms that the historical and social condi-
tions have created for the Hawaiian people-reflecting a real under-
standing of race-the Rice Court merely undertook an abstract hunt 
and peck search for any racial references. 
Reflecting the intellectual (and moral) emptiness of the major-
ity's approach to race, the Court's formalistic approach to racial is-
sues is disturbingly simplistic: (1) search for some element to which 
race can be ascribed; and (2) once found, triumphantly pronounce its 
presence unconstitutional, replete with appropriate abstractions 
about the value of individuals and how "demeaning" any reference to 
race must be. llS 
Consistent with this hunt and peck methodology, after finding 
references to Hawaiians as a race in draft amendments to the Ha-
wai'i State Constitution, state legislature conference committee re-
ports, and the statutory definition of Native Hawaiian, the Court 
held that the "ancestral tracing" required by the OHA voting re-
113. ANGEL R. OQUENDO, Re-Imagining the Latino/a Race, in RICHARD DELGADO & 
JEAN STEFANCIC, THE LATINO/A CONDITION 69 (1998). 
114. Rice, 528 U.S. at 517. 
115. YAMAMOTO, supra note 102, at 45. 
116. See Rice, 528 U.S. at 517. Incredibly, in the final paragraph of its sanctimoni-
ous lecture on race, the Court cited with approval Hirabayshi u. United States, 320 
U.S. 81 (1943), a case in which the Supreme Court actually sanctioned the use of race 
to justify forcing Japanese Americans to observe a military curfew order and to regis-
ter for involuntary relocation from West Coast areas to concentration camps during 
World War II. Id. at 81. Indeed, Hirabayshi and Korematsu u. United States, 323 U.S. 
214 (1944), provided the legal justifications for the wholesale incarceration and forced 
removal of 120,000 persons of Japanese ancestry. For an in depth analysis of the 
significance of these decisions from various perspectives, see Symposium: The Long 
Shadow of Korematsu, 40 B.C. L. REV. 349 (1998); 19 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. (1998). 
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quirement was a race-based voting qualification prohibited by the 
Fifteenth Amendment.ll7 
Given the quagmire of the Court's racial jurisprudence, OHA and 
the State of Hawai'i argued that the OHA voting restriction was not 
race-based. Rather, they explained, the OHA voting requirements 
were consistent with laws "that recognize the special status of abo-
riginal people ... not based on race, but the aboriginal peoples' own-
ership of land and self-government before Europeans took control of 
their lands."118 This was given short shrift by the Court. Although the 
majority implicitly disputed the OHA and State's position, the Court 
stated that it would "stay far off [the] difficult terrain" of whether 
Congress could treat the Native Hawaiians as it does the Indian 
tribes."119 The Court held that OHA elections were elections of public 
117. Rice, 528 U.S. at 516 (quoting the definition of "Native Hawaiian" as "any de-
scendant of not less than one-half part of the races inhabiting the Hawaiian islands 
previous to 1778" "Hawaiian" is defined as any descendant of the "aboriginal peoples 
which exercised sovereignty and subsisted in the Hawaiian Islands in 1778." [d. (quot-
ing HAw. REV. STAT. § 10-2). 
118. OHA Brief, supra note 18, at 14. OHA argued that "[t]he Constitution allows 
Native Americans to exercise control over assets set aside for their benefit." [d. Con-
gress had the power to recognize aboriginal peoples, and federal legislation "reasona-
bly designed to further the cause of Indian self-government" was constitutional. [d. 
(quoting Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 553-54 (1974». This recognition was not 
confined to Native American "tribes" because Native Alaskans and the Pueblo people 
(who were formerly citizens of Mexico) also have been federally recognized. [d. at 17-
20. Moreover, Congress "has repeatedly recognized Native Hawaiians as an aboriginal 
people with a special relationship to the United States." [d. at 16 (citing numerous 
statutes defining Native Hawaiians as Native Americans). Accordingly, the Constitu-
tion's provisions with respect to Indians encompass Native Hawaiians. [d. at 15-16. 
OHA also argued that the special political status of aboriginal peoples was not im-
plicated by the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments because the language of the 
amendments excluded "Indians not taxed," explicitly in the case of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, and by clear implication in the Fifteenth. Thus, "differential treatment 
for Indians," including specific preferences for Indians, was permitted under the Four-
teenth and Fifteenth Amendments. [d. at 22 (citing Mancari, 417 U.S. at 554-55). 
OHA concluded by arguing that Congress had delegated its authority to the State of 
Hawai'i, had ratified the establishment of OHA to benefit Native Hawaiian people, 
and that the State of Hawai'i had independent authority to aid its aboriginal people so 
long as it did not contradict federal law. [d. at 26-29. For an in-depth examination of 
the political status of Native Hawaiians, see Jon M. Van Dyke, The Political Status of 
the Native Hawaiian People, 17 YALE L. & PoL'Y REV. 95, 98-101 (1998) (responding to 
the thesis of an article written by Stuart Minor Benjamin, Equal Protection and the 
Special Relationship: The Case of Native Hawaiians, 106 YALE L.J. 537 (1996) (native 
people are a racial classification unless they are organized into "tribes"». 
119. Rice, 528 U.S. at 519. The Court assumed for sake of argument, "without inti-
mating any opinion," that the underlying OHA structure was valid. [d. at 523-24. The 
phrasing of the Court's finesse of the issues, however, was disingenuous. The Court 
signaled its conclusion by holding that Native Hawaiians are a race for OHA voting 
purposes and through its language limiting Congressional authority to Indian "tribes." 
[d. at 518-20. Moreover, by designating OHA simply as a "an arm of the State," the 
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officials of a state agency, and not elections related to the internal af-
fairs of a "quasi-sovereign" tribe. 120 
In the midst of the legal battle over the categorization of Native 
Hawaiians, a cacophony of popular media on the continent identified 
the issue in Rice as a purely "racial" case using traditional civil rights 
terms. 121 The success of this obfuscation was almost inevitable in an 
Court signaled its rejection of OHA's argument that Congress had delegated its au-
thority over Native Americans to the State through OHA. Id. at 523. 
Justices Breyer and Souter were less equivocal in their concurrence. They argued 
that there was never any trust intended for Native Hawaiians and that "OHA's elec-
torate as defined in the statute [did] not sufficiently resemble an Indian tribe". Id. at 
525 (Breyer, J., and Souter, J., concurring). Indeed, the Breyer and Souter concurrence 
is, in some ways, even more disingenuous than the majority opinion. 
Justice Breyer found that the definition of Hawaiian, articulated in the OHA voting 
requirements (anyone with an ancestor living in Hawai'i prior to 1778), was so broad 
as to be "unreasonable" and that, in any event, the definition was not a construction of 
the Hawaiian people themselves, but of a state entity. Id. at 526-27. While seemingly 
more deferential to notions of self-determination, Justice Breyer also engaged in ab-
stract and formalist speculation. Justice Breyer argued that the definition of "Hawai-
ian" was too broad, including the definition "individuals who are less than one five-
hundredth original Hawaiian (assuming nine generations between 1778 and the pre-
sent)." Id. at 526. The reality, however, is that the rural history of Hawai'i, combined 
with the devastation of the Hawaiian people by disease after the introduction of West-
erners, make Justice Breyer's notion of part-Hawaiians who could claim only one an-
cestor nine generations back a strawman-theoretically possible, but realistically re-
mote. It has been estimated that by 1921 "devastated by poverty, disease and political 
powerlessness, Hawaiians were clearly in danger of losing the battle to survive as a 
race." HANDBOOK, supra note 66, at 44; see also Hawaiian Homestead Brief, supra note 
64, at 2 ("The native people of Hawai'i lost 99% of their lands and over 90% of their 
population in the 120 years between discovery (1778) and annexation (1898)."). 
Justice Breyer's view is seemingly more progressive-that Hawaiians and not the 
state should set the definition of group membership. This argument, however, ignores 
the cohesive voice of a people who have been repeatedly silenced by outside forces. For 
these individuals, transitional entities such as OHA have become the only practical 
alternative. In that respect, Justice Stevens's dissent is equally apt in response to the 
concurrence: "[I]t is a painful irony indeed to conclude that native Hawaiians are not 
entitled to special benefits designed to restore a measure of na tive self-governance be-
cause they currently lack any vestigial native government-a possibility of which his-
tory and the actions of this Nation have deprived them." Rice, 528 U.S. at 535 (Ste-
vens, J., dissenting). 
120. Id. at 520. 
121. See, e.g., Joan Biskupic, Supreme Court Hears Arguments in Race, Voting 
Rights Cases, WASH. POST, Oct. 7, 1999, at All (describing Rice as a "racial discrimi-
nation" case); Can Racial Bias Ever Be Legal?; DOJ Strains to Legitimize Hawaii Law 
that Violates 15th Amendment, FULTON COUNTY DAILY REP., Aug. 17, 1999; Bruce 
Dunford, Hawaii's Race Dilemma, Court to Rule on Natives' Special Rights, CHARLES-
TON GAZETTE, Oct. 4, 1999, at 7A (describing Hawai'i's population as "diverse but not 
always equal" and stating that Hawaiians enjoy "special race-based voting privileges"); 
Bruce Fein, Editorial, Hawaii and Race, WALL ST. J., Oct. 10, 1999 (describing the 
OHA voting requirement as "overtly based on an ethnic criterion" and calling for the 
Supreme Court not to permit Hawai'i to open the door to "racial categories in voting"); 
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environment uneducated about the complexities of Hawaiian history 
and culture, and accustomed to dealing with racial issues in simplis-
tic and biological terms. The popular press and media portrayed Ha-
waiian claims, and specifically the OHA voting requirement, in the 
context of traditional affirmative action disputes. This entirely ob-
scured the real issue at stake-redress for the usurpation of Hawai-
ian sovereignty. 122 
Redress for the loss of independence, however, is entirely differ-
ent from the original notion of affirmative action. Affirmative action 
proposed new institutional priorities to ensure equality of access to 
services and to address the inequality of opportunity imposed upon 
minority groups within the United States. Both traditional affirma-
tive action rationales providing more opportunities for those histori-
cally denied access and the basic arguments against them--"reverse" 
racial preferences-are inapposite when dealing with redressing 
harms suffered by colonization and the loss of sovereignty.123 
The confusion of these issues was not completely unforeseeable. 
The OHA and State of Hawai'i's position that Native Hawaiians are 
not a racial group is, at first glance, counterintuitive. l24 Unless one 
regards race simply as an individual's biological makeup, Justice 
Stevens' notion in his Rice dissent that the appropriate racial cate-
gory for Native Hawaiians is within the broader category of Polyne-
sians, and not a subset of Hawaiians,125 leaves matters of inherited 
Bruce Fein, Resurgent Racism in Hawaii?, WASH. TIMES, Mar. 30, 1999, at A16 (char-
acterizing the OHA requirement as "racial discrimination"); Brian M. Kavanaugh, Are 
Hawaiians Indians?: The Justice Department Thinks So, WALL ST. J., Sept. 9, 1999, at 
A35 (opining that Hawaiians were not a "tribe" and therefore not entitled to the OHA 
"racial voting scheme"); J.R. Labbe, On the Big Docket, FORT WORTH STAR-TELEGRAM, 
Oct. 10, 1999, at 5 (describing the Rice case as whether Hawai'i can "limit by race the 
voters who will elect a nine-member board"); David Tell, Hawaii's Nuremberg Laws, 
WEEKLY STANDARD, Oct. 4, 1999, at 9 (calling the OHA requirement "disgusting," 
"ugly," and "Racist"). 
122. In a "Morning Edition" broadcast on National Public Radio, host Nina Toten-
berg described the Rice case as being about two different "views of race in America." 
She stated that the issue was simply about one vision wanting "to end racism using 
government intervention ... [while the] other vision seeks to end the consideration of 
race at all." Morning Edition, (Nat'l Pub. Radio broadcst, Oct. 6, 1999). 
123. President Johnson's Executive Order in 1967 included gender discrimination 
and prohibited racial discrimination in federal employment or by government contrac-
tors. Exec. Order No. 11,246, 3 C.F.R. 339 (1964-1965), amended by Exec. Order No. 
11,375, 3 C.F.R. 684 (1966-1970). Under section 202 of Executive Order No. 11,246, 
government contracts were required to contain a provision whereby the contractor 
agreed to take affirmative action to ensure equal employment opportunities. Chrysler 
Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281, 286 n.1 (1979). 
124. OHA Brief, supra note 18, at 3 ('''Native Hawaiian' is thus not a reference to a 
racial group .... "). 
125. Justice Stevens opined that if the voter class actually were defined in terms of 
race it would confine OHA voters to "full-blooded Polynesians." Rice, 528 U.S. at 544 
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traditions, culture, history, experience, connection to the (aina, and 
perspective, as well as the historical positioning of Hawaiians in rela-
tion to Western intruders-often marked by racial discrimination-
without any mooring in terms of the relation of these phenomena to 
race. 126 
Indeed, the distinction between racial discrimination, which is 
protected by the equal protection clause, and the loss of sovereignty, 
which is contemplated by the Court's "Indian jurisprudence" such as 
Morton v. Mancari,127 may be illustrated by contrasting the histories 
of the sugar plantation system in Hawai'i in the early twentieth cen-
tury with the contemporaneous illegal takeover of Hawai'i. 
In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, "Sugar 
[was] destined most emphatically to be 'King."'128 The plantation sys-
tem was structured on a racial and class hierarchy.129 By 1882, whites 
(Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Kennedy's questioning at oral argument of John G. 
Roberts, Jr., the attorney for respondent State of Hawai'i, indicated that in his view 
that "real issue" was race and that his framework for considering race was solely in 
traditional "equal access" terms: 
Justice Kennedy: Well, it seems to me, Mr. Roberts, that you begin by say-
ing, now, this is not race, it's a trust. If we had a trust in Oklahoma for peo-
ple who could vote in 1910, and they could go to a special school, everyone 
knows that the reason for that would be that they were white, and it seems 
to me that you're almost afraid of your own best argument by telling us not 
to look at race. Of course it has to do with Hawaiian ethnicity. That's your 
whole argument, I thought ... . 
Mr. Roberts: Oh, that is ... . 
Justice Kennedy: ... [Alnd it seems to me that when you tell us, oh, don't 
worry about it, it's a trust, that just diverts our attention from the real issue 
in this case. 
Supplement Transcript, supra note 49; Westlaw Transcript, supra note 49, at 12-13. 
Justice Kennedy was solely identified in the former source, but the colloquy was re-
ported in both sources. 
126. In his Rice dissent, Justice Stevens tried to separate culture from race by sta t-
ing, "the inhabitants of the Hawaiian Islands whose descendants comprise the instant 
class are identified and remain significant as much because of culture as because of 
race .... It is this culture, rather than the Polynesian race, that is uniquely Hawaiian 
and in need of protection." Rice, 528 U.S. at 542 n.14 (Stevens, J., dissenting). How-
ever, the distinction between "race" and "culture" is not so clear. See Mary Coombs, 
Interrogating Identity, 2 AFR. AM. L. & POL'y REP. 222, 226-27 (1995) (discussing vari-
ous approaches to defining race as shared cultural experience). 
Moreover, the critical relationship of culture to the political sovereignty of indige-
nous people has been expressed as "[tlhe American lesson is that while political auton-
omy does not necessarily translate into cultural autonomy, the tribes' lesson is that 
political autonomy is a prerequisite for cultural autonomy." Richard A. Monette, Sov-
ereignty and Survival, 86 A.B.A. J. 64, 65 (Mar. 2000). 
127. Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 553-54 (1974) (stating that preferences for 
Native Americans were not racial preferences but instead were related to" Indian self-
government"). 
128. RONALD TAKAKI, STRANGERS FROM A DIFFERENT SHORE 132 (2d ed. 1998). 
129. Id. at 138-40. 
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held 88% of the skilled and supervisory positions while approxi-
mately 77% of laborers were either Hawaiian or Chinese. 13o Whites 
were overwhelmingly awarded supervisory positions, and in 1904, 
the Hawaiian Sugar Planters' Association passed "a resolution that 
restricted skilled positions to 'American citizens, or those eligible for 
citizenship.",131 This, in effect, excluded all Asians from skilled or su-
pervisory occupations because they were ineligible to become 
naturalized citizens.132 By 1915, 90% of all mill engineers were of 
European ancestry.133 Life on the plantation was hard, often brutal, 
and racially stratified. 134 In a recent report submitted to the 
President's Advisory Board on Race, the authors observed: 
Hawai'i's present racial realities also trace their root to the segre-
gation of the plantation-era society. The plantation's "divide and 
conquer" system maintained a rigid race-based hierarchy in wealth, 
education, housing conditions, and employment opportunities, with 
whites at the top, Portuguese as overseers, and Chinese, Japanese, 
Korean, and Filipino laborers at the bottom in descending order. 
Over the years, Hawai'i's economy has evolved from agriculture 
and military spending to service industry. Racial stratification per-
sists in what has been described as a modern-day plantation sys-
tem centered around tourism. Those struggling at the socioeco-
nomic bottom now include Samoans, Hawaiians and Tongans, and 
Korean, Southeast Asian and Filipino immigrants. Many of these 
groups perceive distinct, although often subtle, racial and ethnic 
discrimination in jobs, schools and housing. 135 
The equal protection clause contemplates institutionalized racial 
stratification having an impact on discrete American racial groups in 
terms of equal opportunity and treatment within the context of state 
action. This is a kind of discrimination that affects not only Hawai-
ians, but Filipinos, immigrants, other Pacific Islanders, African 
Americans, and others. But those claims, as compelling and critical 
as they are, differ fundamentally from those of Hawaiians with re-
spect to the harms they continue to suffer due to the loss of their 
homeland. 136 
130. Id. at 140. 
131. Id. at 140-41. 
132. Id. at 141. 
133. Id. 
134. Id. 
135. GLENN MELCHINGER, ET AL., HAWAfI RACE REPORT (submitted to Angela Oh, 
member of the President's Advisory Board on Race, September 10, 1998) (footnotes 
omitted). 
136. See WILL KYMLICKA, MULTICULTURAL CITIZENSHIP (1995). Kymlicka observes 
that the "badge of inferiority" for racial and ethnic minorities is their forcible exclusion 
from institutions of the larger polity, whereas for indigenous peoples, it is forcible in-
clusion. Id. at 59-60. 
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Moreover, the political relationship ofthe Hawaiian people to the 
United States is not contradictory to the notion they also have been 
subordinated as a racial grouping. Anti-discrimination laws were not 
intended to, and do not, invalidate special governmental relation-
ships with indigenous people. Because anti-discrimination laws were 
established to "level the playing field" for victims of racial discrimi-
nation within the polity of America, standard civil rights and equal 
protection doctrines do not apply to circumstances involving the rem-
edy for the displacement of a sovereign people from their homeland. 137 
In the Court's famous "footnote 4" in United States v. Carolene 
Products Co., the Court framed the need for heightened judicial scru-
tiny to protect discrete and insular minorities in the context of condi-
tions which tended "seriously to curtail the operation of those politi-
cal processes ordinarily to be relied upon to protect minorities."138 
137. Eric K. Yamamoto, Draft Amicus Brief for various Asian American organiza-
tions at 3 (on file with author) [hereinafter Yamamotol. I drew much inspiration for 
this piece from a draft amicus brief Professor Yamamoto authored during the Rice v. 
Cayetano litigation. While the brief was not ultimately submitted to the Supreme 
Court, its substantive approach is instructive not only in the Rice case, but in suggest-
ing how to deal with issues involving race and indigenous rights in general. 
138. United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 153 n.4 (1938). The ex-
tent to which the circumstances of the Fourteenth Amendment were debated in the 
context of its effect on a strictly "American" polity is vividly illustrated in an extraor-
dinary exchange between Representative William Higby, Republican of California, and 
Representative William Niblack, Republican of Indiana, during the debate over the 
Fourteenth Amendment on the floor of the House of Reresentatives in February of 
1866: 
WILLIAM NIBLACK [R., Ind.]. I beg to inquire of the gentleman whether the 
[Fourteenthl amendment to the Constitution he is advocating is intended or 
calculated to have any effect on the condition of the Chinaman in Califor-
nia .... 
MR. HIGBY. The Chinese are nothing but a pagan race. They are an enigma 
to me, although I have lived among them for fifteen years. You cannot make 
good citizens of them; they do not learn the language of the country; and you 
can communicate with them only with the greatest difficulty, as their lan-
guage is the most difficult of all those spoken; they even dig up their dead 
while decaying in their graves, strip the putrid flesh from the bones, and 
transport the bones back to China. They bring their clay and wooden gods 
with them, and as we are a free and tolerant people, we permit them to bow 
down and worship them .... 
MR. NIBLACK. I understand that gentlemen on the other side have taken the 
position that intelligence is not at all necessary to the exercise of the right of 
voting; that a man, from the fact of belonging to the human race, is entitled 
to vote and to be called a man and brother .... If a Chinaman is one of the 
human race, why should he be degraded below the negro? Why should he not 
receive the same right as the negro? I should like to understand it. The negro 
is of pagan race, and is pagan before he comes here. 
MR. HIGBY. But he is not pagan now. The negro is as much a native of this 
country as the gentleman or myself .... 
MR. NIBLACK. I want to understand why we should exclude one race and in-
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Strict scrutiny analysis, therefore, explicitly rested upon the need for 
protection from discrimination against disempowered groups within 
the political process of the American social fabric. 
The purpose of OHA and its voting requirement's are different 
from remedying past discrimination. They are a part of a panoply of 
political measures to address the harm attendant to the loss of Ha-
waiian sovereignty.139 The creation of governmental structure, voting, 
land reclamation, and cultural resurrection "are not efforts to remedy 
unequal treatment of those voluntarily seeking full participation in 
the polity. They are in every usage of the term, sovereign 'political' 
acts that are not subject to standard strict scrutiny analysis.»140 
The harms to Native Hawaiians at issue are harms not rooted in 
racial discrimination, but rather harms rooted in the loss of sover-
eignty. These harms directly stem from egregious alienation from 
land and culture.14l Not all people in Hawai'i have an equal claim to 
the immense harm caused by the dispossession of Hawai'i by the 
United States; these are claims only of the indigenous Hawaiian peo-
ple. 
The Congressional Joint Resolution of Apology itself acknowl-
edged that "the health and well being of the Native Hawaiian people 
is intrinsically tied to their deep feelings and attachment to the 
land."142 The "impacts associated with losing control over ancestral 
land and resources can be seen in virtually every indicator of social 
or economic progress."143 The statistics with respect to the problems 
within the Hawaiian community "reflect the individual and collective 
pain, bitterness and trauma of a people whose sovereignty has been 
and remains suppressed; who are dispossessed in their own home-
land; and who lack control of the resources of their ancestral lands to 
provide for the welfare of their people."144 
elude another, why we should deny to these people the right of naturaliza-
tion, for instance, and allow it to others. 
MR. HIGBY. I will tell him. They are foreigners and the negro is a native. 
STATUTORY HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES, PART I 197-98 (Bernard Schwartz, 
ed.,1970). 
139. Hawaiian Homestead Brief, supra note 64, at 18; see also Yamamoto Brief, su-
pra note 137, at 9 ("OHA was not established to compensate victims of racial discrimi-
nation. Rather, it was created by the political act of a prevailing sovereign addressing 
the loss of internationally recognized sovereignty of Hawaii's indigenous people."). 
140. Yamamoto Brief, supra note 137, at 4. 
141. Hawaiian Homestead Brief, supra note 64, at 19 (quoting OFFICE OF HAWAIIAN 
AFFAIRS, NATIVE HAWAIIAN DATA BOOK iii (1998)). 
142. Apology Resolution of 1993, supra note 47. 
143. Hawaiian Homestead Brief, supra note 64, at 20; Yamamoto Brief, supra note 
137, at 10. 
144. Yamamoto Brief, supra note 137, at 11; Hawaiian Homestead Brief, supra note 
64, at 20 (quoting LUCIANO MINERBI ET AL., NATIVE HAWAIIAN AND LOCAL CULTURAL 
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Notions of "race" are not completely irrelevant to the inquiry, 
however. 145 Even Queen Lili'uokalani articulated the destruction of 
sovereignty in racial terms: 
And yet this great and powerful nation must go across two thou-
sand miles of sea, and take from the poor Hawaiians their little 
spots in the broad Pacific, must covet our islands of Hawai'i Nei, 
and extinguish the nationality of my poor people, many of who have 
now not a foot of land which can be called their own. And for what? 
In order that another race-problem shall be injected into the social 
and political perplexities with which the United States in the great 
experiment of popular government is already struggling?146 
The white supremacist assault and attempted destruction of a 
people, culture, and historical tradition, all intrinsically connected to 
a "racial" nexus, are inextricably connected to the political status of 
native peoples. 147 The colonization of native people is wrapped and 
AsSESSMENT PROJECT 15 (1993)). 
In Hawai'i, Native Hawaiians are more likely than any other group to be unem-
ployed, in prison, and poor, with the highest rates of suicide and infant mortality and 
the lowest life expectancy. Erin Texeira, Native Hawaiians Gather at Capitol to Bring 
Attention to Plight, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Aug. 9, 1998, at 14; see also Mark Tran, 
Smiles Vanish in Fight for Rights, GUARDIAN (London), Aug. 25, 1996, at 16 (55% fail 
to finish high school, 7% have university degrees, and Native Hawaiians, while 19% of 
the population, comprise 40% of the prison population); Anniversary Stirs Hawaii Sov-
ereignty Movement, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 18, 1993, atA15 (citing OHA). Native Hawaiians 
suffer disproportionately high rates of poverty, alcoholism, suicide, incarceration, and 
homeless ness. Ellen Nakashima, Native Hawaiians Consider Asking for Their Islands 
Back; 100-Year-Old Cause Spurs Sovereignty Vote, WASH. POST, Aug. 27, 1996, at AOl. 
Natives have a 34% higher mortality rate from cancer, heart disease, diabetes, and "all 
other causes of death" compared to the U.S. population. Zan Dubin, III Health Bedevil 
a Once Happy-Go-Lucky Culture, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 30, 1990, at El. 
145. Indeed, one of the criteria for whether a group qualifies as a "tribe" is the racial 
cohesiveness of the group. See supra note 4. 
146. Yamamoto Brief, supra note 137, at 91-100 (quoting LYDIA KAMAKA'EHA 
LIL'OUKALANI, HAWAII'S STORY BY HAWAII'S QUEEN 309-10 (1990 ed.). 
147. Professor Robert Williams observes: 
Like all the varied discourses comprising and enriching Western society's 
thousand-year-old legacy of aggression against peoples of color, the dis-
courses of opposition to tribal sovereignty reflected throughout the various 
documents of barbarism of past and contemporary Indian policy discourses 
seek to justify the white man's privileges of aggression against tribalism 
through racism. The tribal Indian's cultural inferiority justifies the superior 
white society's privilege of domination. The use of racism to privilege the 
white man's aggression against peoples of color is... the fundamental 
mechanism common to all European-derived colonizing discursive practices. 
Robert A. Williams, Jr., Documents of Barbarism: The Contemporary Legacy of Euro-
pean Racism and Colonialism in the Narrative Traditions of Federal Indian Law, 31 
ARIZ. L. REV. 237, 276-77 (1989). Williams quotes Albert Memmi's explanation of why 
racism is an indispensable weapon of the colonizer: 
The fact remains that we have discovered a fundamental mechanism, com-
mon to all racist reactions: the injustice of an oppressor toward the op-
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justified in the rhetoric and the ideology of white supremacy.148 As 
Professor Haunani-Kay Trask states: 
As a result of [American colonization], Hawaiians became a con-
quered people our lands and culture subordinated to another na-
tion. Made to feel and survive as inferiors when our sovereignty as 
a nation was forcibly ended, we were rendered politically and eco-
nomically powerless by the turn of the century. Cultural imperial-
ism had taken hold with conversion to Christianity in the middle of 
the nineteenth century, but it continued with the closing of all Ha-
waiian language schools and the elevation of English as the only of-
ficiallanguage in 1896. Once the Republic of Hawai'i declared itself 
on July 4, 1894, the "Americanization of Hawai'i was sealed like a 
coffin. 149 
Trask's observation echoes that of Frantz Fanon in his work on 
European colonialism in Africa. Fanon linked racial superiority and 
the denigration of indigenous culture directly to both the effect and 
effectuation of colonial domination: 
Every colonized people-in other words, every people in whose soul 
pressed, the formers permanent aggression or the aggressive act he is get-
ting ready to commit, must be justified. And isn't privilege one of the forms 
of permanent aggression, inflicted on a dominated man or group? How can 
any excuse be found for such disorder (source of so many advantages), if not 
by overwhelming the victim? Underneath its masks, racism is the racist's 
way of giving himself absolution. 
Id. at 277 (quoting A. MEMMI, THE COLONIZER AND THE COLONIZED 194 (1965)) (em-
phasis omitted). 
148. There was a drumbeat of arguments relating to Native Hawaiian racial inferi-
ority during the period surrounding the overthrow. "After the Bayonet Constitution, 
racist arguments about Native cultural inferiority and political and economic inability 
appeared daily in the haole newspapers of the times, justifying the seizure of power 
and the deafening calls for annexation." TRAsK, supra note 56, at 12. 
In 1998, the University of Hawai'i renamed its social sciences building from Porteus 
Hall to the Social Science Building. BOR Renames Porteus Hall and Creates Outreach 
College, Newsletter of the University of Hawai'i System (Apr. 10, 1998), available at 
http://www.hawaii.eduinews/kulamaJ9804241kulama980424.html. The former Porte us 
Hall at the University of Hawai'i-Manoa had been named in honor of Stanley David 
Porteus in 1974, but there were widespread protests against this because of Porte us's 
racist views on native Hawaiians and other people of color in Hawai'i. Old Debate Over 
U. of Hawaii Building's Name Is Rekindled, CHRONICLE OF HIGHER EDUC., JAN. 23, 
1998, at A8. In a 1926 book entitled "Temperament and Race," Porteus used overtly 
racist attitudes of Hawai'i plantation overseers as scientific data and created a "scien-
tific theory" which held that Hawaiians were inherently immature, shallow, and had 
"poor mental keenness"; Chinese were secretive, criminal, and had "low brain capac-
ity"; Filipinos were incapable of education; Japanese were unreliable and disloyal; Por-
tuguese were to be considered not representative of the white race as they had a "mix-
ture of negro blood"; and Blacks were characterized by "absolute inferiority." David 
Stannard, Why Porte us Hall must be Renamed, HONOLULU STAR BULLETIN, Dec. 12, 
1997, available at http://starbulletin.coml97/12/12/editorial/viewpointf.html. 
149. Trask, supra note 56, at 16. 
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an inferiority complex has been created by the death and burial of 
its local cultural originality-finds itself face to face with the lan-
guage of the civilizing nation; that is, with the culture of the 
mother country. The colonized is elevated above his jungle status in 
proportion to his adoption of the mother country's cultural stan-
dards. He becomes whiter as he renounces his blackness, his jun-
gle.150 
Thus, while the status of the Hawaiian people is fundamentally 
an issue involving the political relationships between the American 
and Hawaiian people, it is also inherently an issue with racial over-
tones and consequences. Yet these racial consequences contain fun-
damentally different meanings and remedies from those faced by 
American racial minorities. 
In essence, the Supreme Court "mistakenly assumes that every 
classification involving race in any fashion is subject to standard 
equal protection strict scrutiny analysis."i51 According to standard 
contemporary legal doctrine, however, such analysis "is justifiable 
only where necessary to remedy present discrimination or the pre-
sent effects of past discrimination."i52 
Even cases which categorize certain claims of Native people as 
"political" rather than "racial", such as Mancari, do not ignore the ra-
cial elements involved in the relationship between the United States 
and indigenous people, but instead focus on the remedies for loss of 
their sovereignty. As Jon Van Dyke points out: 
It is important to note that the Mancari preference was not free of 
racial overtones, because, as the Court observed, an individual did 
have to have "one-fourth or more degree Indian blood" to qualify for 
preference. 
The Court thus recognized that it was dealing with a mixed politi-
cal/racial category, but it nonetheless concluded without hesitation 
that the "rational basis" level of judicial review should apply, be-
cause the prominent feature of this category was the political rela-
150. FRANTZ FANON, BLACK SKIN, WHITE MAsKS 18 (1967). Fanon eloquently poses 
the cultural and racial imperative that white racial supremacy forced upon colonized 
people: 
[I] begin to suffer from not being a white man to the degree that the white 
man imposes discrimination on me, makes me a colonized native, robs me of 
all worth, all individuality, tells me that I am a parasite on the world, that I 
must bring myself as quickly as possible into step with the white world, "that 
I am a brute beast, that my people and I are like a walking dung-heap that 
disgustingly fertilizes sweet sugar cane and silky cotton, that I have no use 
in the world." Then I ... will compel the white man to acknowledge that I am 
human. 
Id. at 98 (citation omitted). 
151. Yamamoto Brief, supra note 137, at 7. 
152. Id. 
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tionship between native people and the United States govern-
ment.153 
123 
Even the Ninth Circuit's Rice opinion, which upheld the re-
quirement of Hawaiian ancestry in the OHA voting scheme, stated 
that the requirement was "a racial classification on its face."I54 As the 
Supreme Court pointed out in Mancari, "antidiscrimination laws 
were not intended to, and do not invalidate governmental relation-
ships with our aboriginal people, who in some circumstances are ra-
cially defined."155 Justice Stevens underlined this approach in his Rice 
dissent: 
As the preceding discussion of Mancari and our other Indian law 
cases reveal[s), this Court has never understood laws relating to 
indigenous peoples simply as legal classifications defined by race. 
Even where, unlike here, blood quantum requirements are express, 
this Court has repeatedly acknowledged that an overlapping politi-
cal interest predominates. 156 
This is why the fundamental inquiry the Supreme Court under-
took was so misplaced. The inquiry should not be whether Native 
Hawaiians constitute a "race" or a "tribe," or even whether "Hawai-
ian ancestry is a proxy for race." Instead, the question should be 
whether they have been specifically harmed as a people by the loss of 
their nationhood.157 
153. Van Dyke, supra note 118, at 114 (citing Mancari, 417 U.S. at 554). 
154. Rice v. Cayetano, 146 F.3d 1075, 1079 (9th Cir. 1998), affd, 528 U.S. 495 
(2000). 
155. Yamamoto Brief, supra note 137, at 7. 
156. Rice, 528 U.S. at 538-39 n.12 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
157. For an exploration of the reasons why the Mancari rational basis standard is 
not applicable only to Indian "tribes," but also to native peoples not organized into 
tribes, see Van Dyke, supra note 118, at 113-119, 126-130. As Van Dyke cogently ob-
served: "[Ulnlike other ethnic groups who can look to their ancestral homelands to re-
visit their culture and see that their heritage is being maintained, native groups have 
nowhere else to look." Id. at 138 (citing Carole Goldberg-Ambrose, Not "Strictly" Ra· 
cial: A Response to "Indians as Peoples," 39 UCLA L. REV. 169, 184 (1991». Moreover, 
Congress has specifically defined Native Hawaiians as Native Americans in at least 
twenty Acts of Congress and has recognized OHA in at least eight. OHA Brief, supra 
note 18. 
In direct reaction to the Rice decision, on July 20, 2000, Senators Daniel Akaka and 
Daniel Inouye of Hawai'i introduced into the second session of the 106th Congress a 
bill "to express the policy of the United States regarding the United States' relation-
ship with Native Hawaiians." S. 2899, 106th Congo (2000). The bill specifically recog-
nizes that the United States "has a special trust relationship" with Native Hawaiians 
and reaffirms the Apology Resolution. See supra note 33. It also recognizes the con-
tinuing separate cultural, social, and political character of the Native Hawaiian peo-
ple, the desire and right of Native Hawaiian people for self-determination, and the ex-
istence of a distinct "political and legal" relationship. It creates an Office of Special 
Trustee for Native Hawaiian Affairs within the Department of the Interior, the estab-
lishment of a Native Hawaiian Interagency Task Force under the Executive to coord i-
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It is not acceptable to confuse the remedy for loss of nationhood 
with the remedy for the denial of equal access to political, social, and 
economic power demanded by other subordinated groups within 
America. The legal and political remedies are as different from one 
another as are the cures for different diseases. To carry the medical 
metaphor further, we understand from experience that cures for dif-
ferent diseases may be different, cures for different symptoms of the 
same disease may be different, and even that cures for different dis-
eases may be the same.158 But there can be no "cure" without proper 
diagnosis. 
In the final analysis, justice is about rectifying harms. The harm 
to be rectified in Rice must be relevant to the process of this nation's 
reconciliation with the indigenous Hawaiian people for the disposses-
sion of their homeland by our government. Consequently, mecha-
nisms which purport to serve only Hawaiians must be seen not as 
"preferences" but, in a deeper sense, as penance and healing. 
Through entities like OHA, Hawaiians are not seeking privileges or 
handouts. Rather, they are asserting basic international human 
rights-not simply the right to be treated equally but the right to 
self-determination; not a right to entitlements, but to reparation; not 
a right to "special treatment," but an opportunity to reconnect spiri-
tually with land and culture illegally taken from them; not a right to 
greater participation in the U.S. polity, but a form of governmental 
sovereignty outside the American polity. 
All people of Hawai'i-native and non-native alike-have a 
stake in seeing justice done. Failing to distinguish between the 
harms to an indigenous people resulting from loss of their sover-
nate federal policies affecting Native Hawaiians, and the preparation for the organiza-
tion of a Native Hawaiian Interim Governing Council to implement the process of cre-
ating a Native Hawaiian Governing Body that will be recognized as the "representa-
tive governing body of the Native Hawaiian people." Id. 
The passage of this bill would certainly place Native Hawaiians squarely within the 
ambit of Mancari and weaken the doctrinal underpinnings of the Rice majority opin-
ion. However, the bill simultaneously creates other problematic issues for the Native 
Hawaiian people to resolve such as what the implications of an explicit articulation of 
a "trust relationship" with the United States are with respect to sovereignty. See e.g., 
Harold Morse, Akaka's Bill Gets Mixed Response, HONOLULU STAR-BULLETIN, Aug. 1, 
2000, available at http://starbulietin.comJ2000/08/01/news/story12.html. 
Moreover, while the bill is a slap at the majority's decision, it will likely have no im-
pact on the Supreme Court's continued formalist and reactionary approach to race and 
racial jurisprudence. Perhaps the ultimate irony and tragedy of the Rice decision, and 
the answering Akaka Bill itself, is that it continues to force another binary choice-the 
risk of the loss of governmental programs benefitting Hawaiians or the acceptance of a 
ward status-similar to that of Native Americans-under the United States federal 
government when there are so many other choices possible. 
158. Moreover, one of the effects the loss of an indigenous people's sovereignty often 
has racially discriminatory aspects. See supra notes 126-28 and accompanying text. 
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eignty and the harms resulting from the denial of equal social and 
political access within the larger American society of its minority 
populations ensures that no "cure" to either will be forthcoming. 
EPILOGUE 
One of my research assistants, Hokulei, lent me her book of Ha-
waiian proverbs and sayings. I found in it a Hawaiian expression, 
"Ho'i no kau me 'oe (May yours return to you)." According to the 
book's translation and explanation, it is a reply to a person who ut-
ters a curse and thus it means, "I do not accept your curse" and frees 
the speaker from trouble. 159 I offer that expression on behalf of all 
people who have been cursed by a system and a Supreme Court that 
will not respond to cries for reparation, claims of inclusion, and calls 
for justice: 
HO'J NO KAU ME 'OE. 
159. MARy KAWENA PUKUI, 'OLELO No'EAU, HAWAIIAN PROVERBS AND POETICAL 
SAYINGS 111 (1983). 
*** 
